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THE HUMAH SPIRIT IN SPACE

B.J. Bluth, Ph.D.

Professor of Sociology
California State University, Northridge

ABSTRACT

The space ships which have come
from the human imagination have been
extraordinarily successful.
Does
mankind have the spirit to reside in
those ships/ and newly planned space
stations for long periods of time?
Evidence about the performance of
people in isolated and confined
environments for long periods of time
raises issues that need examination.
The Soviet experience in the Salyut 6
shows signs of interpersonal and
individual strain.
Studies of the
Arctic/ Antarctic/ submarines/
oceanographic research vessels/
simulations/ and many other cases
indicate similar episodes that effect
human performance/ and consequently
impinge on mission safety and success.
INTRODUCTION

In his diary written during his
first six month flight aboard the
Salyut 6 Space Station, Valery Ryumin
comments that the experience is much
like that of two college roomates.
There are difficulties with the living
and working complex/ but there is also
the human problem.
"Here we are
totally alone.
Each uttered word
assumes added importance.
One must
bear in mind - constantly - the other's
good and bad sides/ anticipate his
thinking/ the ramifications of a wrong
utterance blown out of proportion".!
In these environments where there
is little privacy/ isolation from the
rest of the world and its affairs/ and
confinement to restrictive quarters
serving a small/ unchanging group of
people/ there seem to be numerous
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instances of disruptive interpersonal
problems which impact the mission
safety and effectiveness.
There is
also an indication that such problems
may have variable elements which can be
adjusted to provide a more conducive
interpersonal network. Knowing what
problems might be expected/ and what
techniques might work is the next step
in doing actual work in long term space
operations.
PRECEDENTS

Considerable research has been
done looking at small groups in
conf ined/ isolated, and stressful
environments/ including the Antarctic/
submarines/ oc e an og raph ic resea rch
vessels/ u n d er s ea r ese ar c h labs/
Alas'-;an oil pipe construction sites,
oil tankers/ and especially designed
simulations. None of these situations
exactly replicates permanent human
operation of a space facility. The
complex factors which vary from these
analogs include crew size, the degree
and type of isolation and confinement,
the composition and organization of the
crew, t h e w o r k t o be d o n. e , t h e
historical, context, and especially the
unique characteristic of space -w e i ghtiess ness and a11 i ts re1a ted
influences. What is important about
these s t u. d i e s i s t h a t s o m e o f t h e
predictions have been verified in the
Soviet experiences aboard the Salyut 6
Space Station. This suggests a careful
look at these studies will provide some
ideas about what dilemmas might arise
in. long term missions*
The Arctic and the Antarctic
A n t a. r c t i c s t a t i o n s, w h e r e t h e
con f i n e m e n t d u e t o w i n t e r i n g - o v e r
varies between six months and a year,

vary in size r with large stations
numbering over 100, and smaller
research bases having crews of 14 to
40.
Crews are composed of Naval
personnel who are responsible for the
maintenance of the station and civilian
research scientists.
So far, one murder has been
reported2, stabbings, and many reports
of stress. The Naval contingent of
crews stationed at various Antarctic
stations showed an increase of 40% in
symptoms of anxiety, depression,
insomnia, and hostility.3 Though the
percentage increases were not as high
for the civilian scientists, they
showed the same symptoms.
Both groups
were most threatened by emotional
instability and social incompatibility.
A consistent emphasis on
personality-oriented behavior developed
as opposed to the expected
task-oriented behavior.4
What is important about these
incidents is that they are not easily
predictable.
"Neither emotional
stability* social compatibility, nor
overall performance could be accurately
predicted by clinical evaluations,
personality scales, opinion survey
items, or personal history."4

Qceanographic Research Vessels
In oceanographic research ships
coming from Woods Hole, Scripps
Institute, and elsewhere, problems
between the ship's crew and the
scientists also occur.
On one
occasion, a crew tossed overboard a
large part of the specimens gathered on
the two year voyage of the British
Antarctic R/V BransfieId because of a
dispute about the use of a freezer to
store soft drinks.5
Cultural differentiation between
the various segments of the crews:
merchant marine, ex-Navy, technicians,
and scientists, is an important factor
in explaining some hostilities that
exist.
Not all situations result in
sabotage to the scientific goals of the
voyage,, but conflicts' arise over port
time, seating, and use of various
sections of the ship. Usually the two
groups interact as little as possible,
a n. d n o t at all socially.
S u.c h
differences in values, interests, and
background also show up in strain over
music, leisure activities, and group
membership*5

Scientists on these voyages also
f ind ' it hard! to do any creative

thinking.
Lab technicians forget or
miss steps in their work.
Scientists
at deep sea drilling projects have also
been known to recommend unsound
projects, forgetting the simple
principles of their disciplines.6

Submarines
During an 83-day cruise of the
Trition, where 79 days of the 83 day
mission were spent submerged in a
circumnavigation of the world.
The
research results showed a "definite
increase in feelings described as
irritable, annoyed, disinterested, feel
like giving up, bored stiff,
uncomfortable, and frustrated".7
The general conclusion from the
submarine studies seems to be that
there is a negative decrement in
overall alertness and reaction time.
During World War II severe neurotic and
psychotic behavior was observed during
"silent running" when the ship was in
danger or under attack.8,9
Undersea Laboratories
In the 30 day Ben Franklyn cruise
carried out to determine psychological
and physiological reactions to long
duration and confinement, a crew of six
men were towed in a submersible vessel
down the East coast.
The desire to
participate was the main factor in crew
selection, and compatibility was not
used to determine crew membership. As
the mission increased, the crew showed
a general trend toward personal
withdrawal and an increased need for
privacy. Tension increased gradually,
and all members of the crew experienced
difficulty sleeping at different times
during the mission. A major conflict
arose between members of the crew and
the surface staff resulting in failures
and misunderstandings in communication,
and bursts of anger and frustration.
Indications about these interpersonal
difficulties did not show up in early
testing nor in the training time on the
Langley Research Complex Coordinator.
Crew proficiency was adversley affected
in this case.10,11
Space Simulations
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NASA engaged in a full scale
simulation of a Spacelab flight in
1977, having Principal Investigators go
through all the p.repatory sequences for
a life-sciences mission during the
preceeding year.
The mission
culminated in a 7 day simulated flight
carried out at Johnson Space Center
from May 17th to May 23 of 1977.

The crew of the simulation (known
as the SMD III) was composed of an
astronaut Mission Specialist and two
Payload Specialists, leaving out the
astronaut pilot and co-pilot. Problems
in the SMD III began during the
preparation and training phases.
Difficulties developed over the scope
of decision-making authority regarding
experiments and over lines of
communication.12 Interpersonal tension
was reported to be high throughout the
Overall, the
7 day simulation.
problems resulted in disruption to some
of the mission objectives.13
Dr. Joe Brady and his associate
Dr. Henry Eumrian have been conducting
simulations of confined microsocieties
in an especially designed, programed
These
environment for many years.
studies have shown that the way work
and interpersonal contacts are
organized have an important impact on
the quality and amount of work done as
well as crew morale and motivation. New
members introduced into a group can be
rejected, or can have a negative impact
on total group work performance through
being denied access to work facilities
or because of individual reactions to
Similar results in
the new members.
the quality and amount of work done and
group interaction are found when the
standards for work are altered, even
slightly, with increases in
testosterone and decreases in work
output or outright refusal to work at
all.14
THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE

The Salyut 6 Space Station ha^s
been on orbit since early 1977, and has
been the scene of four of the longest
space missions to date: 96 days, 139
days, 175 days, and 185 days (the
longest American mission was 84 days
flowm by a crew of three in the Skylab
Prime crews are composed of
in 1974).
two cosmonauts who have visitations by
two other cosmonauts at different times
The interior
during the missions.
volume of the Salyut 6 Station is
approximately 91 cubic meters (compared
to 351 cubic meters in the Skylab or 71
cubic meters in the Space Shuttle), or
what you might have in a large motor
home.

television and by voice analysis
detect signs of stress, and
responsible for developing measures
deal with any symptoms that
develop.15,16

to
is
to
do

In spite of all these activities,
General Georgi Beregovoi, Chief of Crew
Training, reports that on all four of
the long duration missions, the crews
have developed signs of interpersonal
hostility.17 Though he is quick to say
that they do not get involved in fist
fights (if that is possible in
weightlessness), and the Soviets have
concluded that incompatible people can
work together in space on flights
However, on
limited to a few weeks.
flights of a month it becomes a factor,
and on longer flights compatability is
The crews also
essential. 18
demonstrate incidents of hostility with
the ground control staff which have
resulted in misunderstanding and errors
in communication. They have held back
on confidential messages and
deliberately hidden information and
reactions, showing considerable
agitation at what they deem "constant
nitpicking from the Earth".19 There is
also a rumor that on the last 185 day
mission cosmonauts Ryumin and Popov
turned off all radio communication with
the ground for two days.
The crews show mood swings,
increases in tension, and difficulty
According to Cosmonaut
sleeping.
Kovalenok, "In space you want to "load
yourself with work so the time will go
Otherwise, you feel that the
faster.
time slows down," and then you feel the
lonliness, or you start thinking of
aches, pains, sinus congestion, or your
general physical condition.20
Since interpe rsonal r ela t ion ships
are so intense, the Soviets have done
away with the concept of commander and
an "absolute emphasis of a hierarchical
structure in a crew consisting of 2-3
people".21
Multi-national crews are sent up
to visit the long duration crews in
However
order to break the boredom.
they can als o bring a de g r ee of
hostility, m i. s u n d e r s t a n d i ng r an d
confusion based on language and value
C zec h Cosmonaut Rem ek
differences.
commented that with the high stress
t e n. s ion of f e e lings, u n i q u e c u, 11 u r a 1
"mental features disrupt the harmony
among crew members 11 and foreign, accents
11 deform Russian expressions" leading to
Le a r n i ng t h e
m i s und e rs t and ing .
language of the flight crew so there is

Prior to each mission, extensive
tests and plans are undertaken by the
Group for Psychological Support to
ensure the compatibility of the crew
members and provide training for the
flight. During each mission this Group
constantly monitors the crews over
8-53

no need to translate is also an
imperative for times of danger when
there is so little time to translate
from one language to another.22
The Soviets note that "from the
standpoint of group psychological
training, one should note that one can
hardly rely upon selection in each case
of an ideal crew".21
Satisfying the
whole range of socio/psychological
requirements is met by a program that
combines selection in conjunction with
an intensive program of psychological
training.
In spite of all their programs,
however, the Soviets still think that
they have not reached a "scientifically
founded and effective program of
psychological training of the crew".19
STRESS AS A FACTOR OF SPACE FLIGHT

The precedent research and the
Soviet experiences in the Salyut 6
Space Station indicate that social and
psychological factors become more
salient the longer the duration of a
mission.
Two or three weeks seem to
pose some problems, but small groups in
isolated environments for longer
periods show higher degrees of
performance degradation traceable to
human factors and the possible effects
of weightlessness. If effectiveness and
mission safety are to remain important
goals, these variables need careful
attention.
SYMPTOMS

SYMPTOMS OF ISOLATED
AND CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS
o Irritability
o Anxiety
o Depression
o Tension
O' Sleep Disorders
o Hostility
o Lowered Efficiency
o Mood fluctuation.
o Social Withdrawal
o Vacillating Motivation
o Fatigue
SYMPTOMS
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

OF GENERALIZED STRESS
Irritability
Anxiety
Depression
Tension
Sleep Disorders
Anger
Lowe red Ef £ iciency
Excessive Emotion
Defensiveness
Lack of Concentration
Tiredness

Isolation and confinement in a
hostile, dangerous environment are
important factors in the generation of
stress, but they should not be thought
of as the only factors.
Research in
industrial social psychology, crowding,
loneliness,organizational design, group
dynamics, role relationships, small
groups, social disorganization, etc.
all show many of the same symptoms
found in the precedent studies and the
Soviet Salyut experiences.
This
research also indicates that reduction
of some of these sources of stress is
possible through the introduction of
various training techniques and
organizational systems.23
These symptoms of Generalized
Stress have been traced to many
different factors over a wide range of
studies.
Some are, conflicting
definitions of a situation; mismatched
work, organization, and leadership
systems; scheduling; expectations;
group size; reduced roles; boredom;
reduced sensory input; architectural
arrangements; group composition;
training; sexually mixed groups;
communication systems; physiological
factors, etc.
Some of the causes of
these symptoms can be eliminated or
mitigated, some must simply be
recogonized and accepted.
Solutions to some of these
problems are possible through
pre-flight socio/psychological
training, attention to group
organizational systems and dynamics,
and the relationship of human
individual and group requirements to
the design of space-based working and
living environments. Since groups can
develop as a important buffer to
stress, elimination of as many areas of
tension as is possible can go a long
way in bringing about mission
effectiveness, safety, and the
creative, satisfying interaction of the
people involved.
CONCLUSION

Up until now American space
science and engineering has worked with
the aim of optimizing all systems for
safety and success.
The results have
been a remarkable achievement. As the
windows of expectations expand to
longer and longer missions, however,
there is ample evidence that the human
spirit may buckle under some of the
conditions posed by space habitation.
The same attitude toward optimization
of space craft systems for safety and
success also applies to the human
8-54

Humans are not
factor in the loop.
infinitely adaptable. The boundaries
of tolerance of the conditions of space
flight seem to be found after a three
month stay r extending as the time
continues. When the same approach that
is given to the inclusion of a piece of
hardware is applied to the human
factor, this boundary may be
A good
significantly extended.
engineer is not going to place a system
into a spacecraft until as much as
possible is understood about the
tolerances of that hardware, its
relationship to various environmental
circumstances, and its capabilities. A
similar approach to the human factor
gives the crewmember the advantage of
much more knowledge to deal with the
unexpected, and more alternatives to
cope with anticipated trials. Workable
techniques are available, and can be
adjusted to the special circumstances
of space. Not to do so would leave the
most facile element in the loop, the
human being, subject to needless
ignorance, randomly developed social
systems, and unnecessary hazards. The
conclusion reached by the National
Academy of Sciences in 1972 is even
more true today: "If man is to
participate in long duration space
flight, his requirements — physical,
pyscho 1ogica 1 , behavioral, and
interpersonal — must be given far more
attention than has heretofore been the
case in the design of the spacecraft
and the mission."24

REFERENCES

"Alleged Murder on Arctic Ice
1.
Island Is Linked to Dispute Over Wine;
U.S. Jurisdiction in Case Ruled" New
York Times. August 6, 1970,
2. Valery Ryumin. "175 Days in
Space: A Russian Cosmonaut's Private
Diary — An Incredible Human Document".
Edited and translated by Henry Gris.
Unpublished manuscript. 1980.
E. K. Gunderson. Mental
3.
Health Problems in Antarctia. Archives
of Environmental Health. Vol 17, Oct.
1968, pp. 558-564.
E.K. Gunderson. Interview,
4.
October 23, 1981.
H. R. Bernard and Peter D.
5.
Killworth. Scientists and Crew; A Case
jStiidy in Communication at Sea. Of f i. ce
Contract
of Naval Research*
IN00014-73-A-0417-0001, AD-76 629.
Spr i ng f i e1d,VA: National Tec hni cal
Information Service. April., 1974*
6. E. Castore. Interview. October
21, 1981.

J. F. Kubis and E.J.
7.
Psychological Aspects of
McLaughlin.
Space Flight. Translations of the New
York Academy of Science, Series II,
Vol. 30, No. 2, Dec., 1967, pp.
320-330.
8. B. B. Weybrew: "Psychological
Problems of Prolonged Marine
Submergence." in N.E. Burns, Unusual
Environments and Human Behavior.
London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.
J. H. Ebersole: "The New
9.
Dimensions of Submarine Medicine". New
England Journal of Medicine. Vol 262,
1960, pp. 599-610.
10. J. M. Ferguson: Use of the Ben
Franklin Submersible as a Space Station
Summary Technical
Vol. I.
Analog.
Report, OSR-70-4, NASA 8-30172, 1970.
11. Sherman P. Vinograd, Project
Director. Studies of Social Group
Dynamics Under Isolated Conditions.
Washington, DC.
NASA CR-2496.
December, 1974, pp. 135-140.
12. Robert Helmreich, John Wilhelm,
Trieve Tanner, Joan E. Sieber, and
Susan Burgenbach. A Critical Review of
Ames Life Science Participation in
Spacelab Mission Development Test jUs
The SMD III Management Study. NASA, TM
#78494. Ames Research Center, Moffett
Field, June, 1978.
13. John A. R u m m e 1 , e t a 1 .
Prel iminary S p a. c e 1, a b Mis s i Q n
Development Test III (SMD ILL), Final
Report , Vol I, Scientific Experiments.
NASA, JSC-13950, Johnson Space Center,
Houston, TX.
Henry H. Emiurian, Ph.D. and
14.
Joseph V. Brady, Ph.D., James L.
Meyerhoff, M.D. and Edward H* Mougey,
"Behavioral and Biologic a1
M.S.
Interactions with C on fi ned
M i c r o s oc i e t i e s i n a P r o g r amme d
P ap er pr esented at
Environment " •
P r i n c e t o n Confer e n c e o n, S p a c e
Manufacturing. May, 1980.
15. Kidger, Neville. il!The Salyut 6
Space Station 11 . Space f light. Vol. 21.
No. 4, April, 1979, pp. 178-183,
16. Hooper, Gordon R. "Missions to
Salyut 6". 'Spaceflight. Vol 21. No. 7.
July, 1979, pp. 318-124.
17. Ge org i Bereg ovoi, Chief of
Inte rv i ew:
Cos monaut C rew Tra i ni ng.
Munich, West Germany,, September, 1979,
18. "Conversation in the editorial
of the LG: E xperi ence o f Char ac ter™ *
li i t .e r a r y Q a z et t ^ .• No • .1 (4 7 $ 5) J an u a r y *.
1980'., PP.. 12-13.
" "I* h e
1 9 . V • I , S ev a s t * y an o v •
C e r t a i n
o f
A p p e a r a n c e
P s y c ho 1 op hy s i o 1 og i c a 1 C ha ract e r i st i cs
of Man. Under Conditions of Space
P 1 I g ht m i n
____.._..
Flights ed. by B. N* Petrov r B.F*
8-55

"Nauka"
Lomov, and N.D. Samsonov.
Press, Moscow/ 1979.
20. Cosmonaut Kovalenok.
September,
Interview: Tokyo, Japan.
1980.
M.A. Novikov. "The
21.
Psychophysiologial Selection, Crew
Manning, and Training for Space
Flight", in Psychological Problems of
Space Flights, ed. by B.N. Petrov, B.F.
"Nauka"
Lomov, and N.D. Samsonov.
Press. Moscow, 1979.
22. V. Remek. C ommun i ca ti on
Problems of International Crews. Paper
presented at the XXXth Congress of the
International Astronautical Federation.
Munich, West Germany. September 16-22,
1979.
23. B.J. Bluth and S.R. McNeal.
Influential Factors of Negative Effects
in the Isolated and Confined
Paper presented at the
Environment.
5th Princeton/AIAA/SSI Conference on
Princeton, New
Space Manufacturing.
Jersey. May 18-21, 1981.
24. Donald Foltz. "...Behavioral
Science Has Clearly Played the
Understudy Compared to Hard Science and
Engineering in the First Two Decades of
America's Race in Space. Not Quite So
in the Soviet Union, Say the
Experts...". APA Monitor. Vol. 12 Nos
8&9. (August/September) 1981. pp. 8-9,
71.

8-56

